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Mathematical Cognition
A Case of Enculturation
Richard Menary
Most thinking about cognition proceeds on the assumption that we are born with
our  primary  cognitive  faculties  intact  and they simply  need  to  mature,  or  be
fine-tuned by learning mechanisms. Alternatively, a growing number of thinkers
are aligning themselves to the view that a process of enculturation transforms our
basic biological faculties. What evidence is there for this process of enculturation?
A long period of development, learning-driven plasticity, and a cultural environ-
ment suffused with practices, symbols, and complex social interactions all speak in
its favour. In this paper I will sketch in outline the commitments of the encultur-
ated approach and then look at the case of mathematical cognition as a central
example of enculturation. I will then defend the account against several objections.
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Since cognitive science took an ecological turn it
has been casting around for new frameworks in
which  to  conduct  its  main  business:  experi-
mental research. Those who have taken the eco-
logical  turn  are  convinced  that  classical  and
brain-bound frameworks don’t provide the ne-
cessary  conceptual  and  experimental  tools  re-
quired to make sense of cognition in the wild
(Hutchins 1995).  A  number  of  alternative
frameworks have been proposed, with embodied
cognition the most frequently adopted. The the-
oretical framework one uses to understand cog-
nition has profound empirical consequences for
scientific  practice.  For  example,  it  influences
what we consider to be the relevant phenomena
of interest, what questions we ask about them,
how we design and perform experiments,  and
how we interpret results (Beer 2000). The the-
oretical framework of classical computation, for
example,  approaches cognitive processing as a
matter of input represented symbolically, which
is  then  syntactically  processed  according  to
stored knowledge that the system has. It pro-
poses a single “sandwich style” layer of cognit-
ive  processing,  involving  input,  computation,
and output (Hurley 2010). 
The theoretical framework of CI (cognitive
integration;  Menary 2007)  proposes  something
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altogether  different:  multiple  cognitive  layers
where  neural,  bodily,  and  environmental  pro-
cesses all conspire to complete cognitive tasks.
Although the framework is unified by a dynam-
ical systems description of the evolution of pro-
cessing in the hybrid and multi-layered system,
it recognises the novel contributions of the dis-
tinct processing profiles of the brain, body, and
environment.  Furthermore,  the  CI  framework
explains our cognitive capabilities for abstract
symbolic thought by giving an evolutionary and
developmental  case  for  the  plasticity  of  the
brain  in  redeploying  older  neural  circuits  to
new, culturally specific functions—such as read-
ing, writing, and mathematics (Menary 2014). I
call this a process of enculturation. 
This paper seeks to outline the phylogenetic
and ontogenetic conditions for the process of en-
culturation. It will take mathematical cognition,
particularly the evolutionary basis for mathemat-
ical cognition, as a core example of enculturation.
In so doing, I hope to have given an account of
why enculturation exists, how it happens, and in
what ways it can be defended against objections.
In the first section I will explore the relationship
of CI to cognition embodied, embedded, enacted,
extended (4E) cognition and then explain why so-
cial and cultural practices are important to the
process of enculturation. In the  second section I
will outline the core concepts required to make
sense of enculturation: continuity, transformation,
novelty, and uniqueness.  The  third section will
introduce the example of mathematical cognition,
moving from the evolutionary basis for numeros-
ity and numerical cognition to the precise opera-
tions of mathematics. The fourth section will give
an account of mathematical cognition as a case of
enculturation. In the  final section I outline two
possible objections and respond to them.
2 Where does CI sit in the 4E 
landscape?
Traversing the 4E landscape one rises from the
lowlands  of  weakly  embodied  and  embedded
cognitive science to the giddy heights of strong
embodiment and embedding.  Embodied cogni-
tion is the thesis that at least some of our cog-
nitive  states  and processes  are constituted by
bodily processes that are not brain-bound. Em-
bedded cognition is the thesis that our cognitive
systems  are  located  in  and  interact  with  the
surrounding  physical  and  social  environment.
Enactive and extended approaches to cognition
inhabit the rarefied atmosphere of the strongly
embodied and embedded peaks. However, there
are important differences between enaction and
extension and between those variants and CI.
To determine where CI and enculturation sit in
the 4E landscape, I will use a dimensional ana-
lysis I first introduced in Menary (2010).
Embodied mind
Embodied mind weak: the mind/brain
is  embodied  (compatible  with
internalism/individualism  Smart 1959;
Stich 1983)  
Embodied mind moderate: some of our
mental and cognitive processes and states
depend1 upon our non-neural body (Galla-
gher 2005; Gallese 2008)  
Embodied  mind  strong:  some  of  our
mental and cognitive processes and states
are constituted by processes of the body
acting in  and on the environment (com-
patible with enactivism Varela et al. 1991,
and CI Menary 2007)
Embedded mind
Embedded mind weak: All the percep-
tual  inputs  to  and  behavioural  outputs
from cognitive  systems  are  found  in  the
environment  (compatible  with
internalism/individualism  Adams &  Aiz-
awa 2008;  Rupert 2009)  
Embedded  mind  moderate:  Mental
and  cognitive  states  and  processes  are
scaffolded or causally depend upon the en-
vironment (Sterelny 2003; Wheeler 2005) 
Embedded mind strong:  Some mental
and cognitive processes and states are in-
tegrated  with  environmental  states  and
processes into a single system (compatible
with extended mind  Clark 2008,  this col-
lection; Menary 2007; Rowlands 2010)
1 Here we might take dependence simply to be a causal, and not a
constitutive,  relation.  Perhaps  my  gesturing  in  a  particular  way
causes my recalling a word.
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Weakly embodied  mind is  just  the old  thesis
that the mind is identical to the brain. One can
be an individualist and hold to this form of em-
bodiment, and I won’t consider the implications
of the view here. The work of some2 embodied
cognition researchers will fall under the moder-
ate  sense  of  embodiment.  For  example,  those
who  attempt  to  show  that  concepts  or
word-meanings  are  causally  dependent  upon
sensori-motor areas of the brain (Glenberg 2010;
Gallese 2008)  commit  to a moderate sense of
embodiment. The strong sense of  embodiment
focuses on how cognition is constituted by bod-
ily interaction with the environment, and I shall
focus on the discussion here. CI and enactivism
occupy this region of the environment, but with
different emphases on the nature of the interac-
tion and the evolutionary continuity of simple
and complex cognitive systems. CI also occupies
the strongly-embedded region, but I shall deal
with the relation between CI and cognitive ex-
tension in the next sub-section.
Enactivism (excluding its radical variant)3
allows that even simple living systems are cog-
nitive.  Enactivists  are  committed  to  the  con-
tinuity of  life  and mind and so  they propose
cognitive and even mental states and processes4
for much simpler biological systems than would
CI (Varela et al. 1991).5 Whilst I am sympath-
etic  with  the  commitment  to  continuity
between simple cognitive systems and complex
cognitive systems, it is questionable whether we
should argue that simply being a living organ-
ism provides sufficient cognitive complexity for
conscious  experience  and  sense  (or  meaning)
making.
CI does not require us to think that com-
plex cognitive and mental phenomena, such as
conscious experience, are shared by all living or-
2 One could look at a classic paper on mind/brain identity such as
Smart (1959).
3 See  Thompson (2007)  for  an account  of  the life-mind continuity,
Stewart et  al. (2010)  for  a  volume dedicated  to  enactivism,  and
Hutto & Myin (2013) for a self-proclaimed radical variant.
4 See for example Barbaras (2010), which argues that to live is to have
intentional consciousness of living.
5 Interestingly, radical enactivsts appear to agree with CI on this issue; see
Hutto &  Myin (2013,  p.  35).  However,  the  radicals  have  a  problem
bridging the gap between basic cognitive processes and enculturated ones,
since they think that meaning, or content, can only be present in a cognit-
ive system when language and cultural scaffolding is present (Hutto &
Myin 2013). That, of course, doesn’t sit well with evolutionary continuity.
ganisms  whatever  their  complexity  or  simpli-
city. This is  to assume that the properties of
complex cognitive systems will be found even in
very simple cognitive systems. According to CI,
this gets things the wrong way round: there is a
continuity from very simple systems that inter-
act with their environments, by having mechan-
isms  that  track  or  detect  salient  features  of
their  environments,  to  complex  systems  that
have  a  wider  range  of  cognitive  capabilities
(traits) including memory, inference, communic-
ation, problem solving, social cognition, and so
on. By contrast a phylogeny of cognitive traits
would  show  the  distribution  of  those  traits
(across species) and help us to understand both
the  evolutionary  pressures  that  produce  more
complex kinds of cognitive systems and the in-
novations that bring about new traits.6 
CI provides a phylogenetic  and ontogen-
etic basis for when bodily interactions are cog-
nitive processes. Along with niche construction-
ists (Laland et al. 2000), CI maintains a phylo-
geny of hominid cognition in terms their active
embodiment in a socially constructed cognitive
niche. Ontogentically, neonates acquire cognit-
ive abilities to create, maintain, and manipulate
the  shared  cognitive  niche,  including  tools,
practices, and representational systems. Cognit-
ive processing often involves these online bodily
manipulations of the cognitive niche, sometimes
as  individuals  and  sometimes  in  collaboration
with others. CI has a unique position on the 4E
landscape, because it is the first framework to
propose that the co-ordination dynamics of in-
tegrated  cognitive  systems  are  jointly  orches-
trated  by  biological  and  cultural  functions.
What,  though,  are  the  cultural  functions  in
question?
2.1 Cognitive practices as cultural 
practices
Both CI and extended mind (EM) occupy the
strong embedding region, but they do so in dif-
ferent  ways.  Here  I  will  differentiate  CI  as  a
thesis  of  enculturation  from  Clark’s  organ-
6 See for example Sterelny’s cognitive phylogeny in Sterelny (2003) and God-
frey-Smith’s complexity thesis in Godfrey-Smith (1996). See MacLean et al.
(2012) for an overview of the problems for a comparative phylogeny.
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ism-centred approach to EM. Cognitive integra-
tion is a model of how our minds become encul-
turated.  Enculturation rests in the acquisition
of  cultural  practices  that  are  cognitive  in
nature.  The  practices  transform  our  existing
biological  capacities,  allowing  us  to  complete
cognitive  tasks,  in  ways  that  our  unencultur-
ated brains and bodies will not allow. Cultural
practices  are  patterns  of  action  spread  out
across  cultural  groups  (Roepstorff 2010;
Hutchins 2011; Menary 2007, 2010, 2012). Cog-
nitive  practices7 are  enacted  by  creating  and
manipulating informational structures8 in public
space. This can be by creating shared linguistic
content and developing it through dialogue, in-
ference, and narrative; or it can be by bodily
creating and manipulating environmental struc-
tures,  which  might  be  tools  or  public  and
shared  representations  (or  a  combination  of
both). Examples of  linguistically mediated ac-
tion include self-correction by use of spoken (or
written)  instructions,  co-ordinating  actions
among a group, or solving a problem in a group
by means of linguistic interaction. Examples of
creating  and  manipulating  public  and  shared
representations include using a graph to repres-
ent quantitative relationships; using a diagram
to represent the layout of a circuit or building;
using a list to remember a sequence of actions;
or  to  solve  an  equation,  to  mathematically
model a domain, to make logical or causal con-
nections between ideas, and so on. Practices can
be combined into complex sequences of actions
where  the  physical  manipulation  of  tools  is
guided  by spoken  instructions,  which  are  up-
dated across group members. A simple example
of  a  group  brainstorming  with  one  member
writing out the answers would be an example of
7 I don’t mean to suggest that there can’t be other effects of cog -
nitive practices, but since practices are just the cultural formal-
isation of patterns of action across a population, or group, cog -
nitive  practices  are  tied directly  to  these  patterns  of  action.  I
can’t  provide  a  detailed  origin  account  for  cognitive  practices
here, but see Menary (2007, Ch. 5) for an early attempt to do so.
However,  the  account  of  mathematical  cognition  I  give  in  the
next two sections provides an example of how such an account
would be likely to look.
8 The primary cases I am thinking of are public systems of representa-
tion, including spoken language. However, I don’t want to rule out
cases involving tools, bodily gestures, artistic or bodily adornments,
and the intelligent use of space and objects.
a complex of collaborative cognitive practices.9
Cognitive  practices  are  culturally  endowed
(bodily)  manipulations  of  informational  struc-
tures. 
Practices  govern  how  we  deploy  tools,
writing  systems,  number  systems,  and  other
kinds  of  representational  systems  to  complete
cognitive  tasks.  These  are  not  simply  static
vehicles  that  have  contents;  they  are  active
components embedded in dynamical patterns of
cultural practice. Practices are public, and they
are also  embodied  and enacted.10 We embody
practices:  they become the ways in  which we
act, think, and live. They structure our lifeways
(although not exclusively). 
CI  does  not  deny  that  much  thinking
takes place offline in the brain, but it does take
the online and interactive mode of thought to
be adaptive. Again, this line of thought has pre-
cursors,11 but  CI,  uniquely,  takes  interactive
thought  as  a  basic  category,12 which  is  then
scaffolded by culturally evolved practices. Prac-
tices  stabilise  and  govern  interactive  thought
across a population of similar phenotypes. The
stable patterns of action can then be inherited
by the  next  generation,  because  the  practices
have become settled and are part of the devel-
opmental niche in which the minds of the next
generation grow. Our brains co-adapted to the
stable spread of practice and its role in onto-
geny—resulting in the slow evolution of the cul-
tural brain. 
The focus upon practice and culture marks
cognitive integration out from variants of exten-
ded cognition, such as Clark’s organism-centred
approach to extension (2008). Clark’s organism
centred approach takes the assembly of exten-
ded cognitive systems to be controlled by the
9 For  two very good overviews of  collective  or group cognition see
Theiner (2013) and Huebner (2013).
10 Jennifer Windt helpfully pointed out that practices can be thought of as
public, because they are embodied and enacted. I think that this is just
right: practices are patterns of action spread across a population. How-
ever, I am inclined to think that practices are not simply reducible to the
bodily actions of individuals. Whilst doing long multiplication requires a
bodily action of me, what I am doing cannot be described exclusively in
terms of those bodily actions. The practice is a population, or group level
phenomenon, not an individual one.
11 The classical pragmatists, particularly Peirce and Dewey, held that
thought was interactive. See Menary (2011) for a description of prag-
matist approaches to thought, experience and the self.
12 See  Menary (2007,  Ch. 5),  where  I  make a detailed evolutionary
case.
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discrete organism, and brain, at the centre of it.
He thereby reduces the role of cultural practices
in large or small groups of organisms in the ex-
planation  of  cognitive  assembly.  “Brains  are
special,  and to assert this need mark no slip-
pery-slope concession to good old-fashioned in-
ternalism as an account of mind. It is fully con-
sistent with thinking (as I do) that Hutchins is
absolutely  right  to  stress  the  major  role  of
transmitted  cultural  practices  in  setting  the
scene  for  various  neurally-based  processes  of
cognitive  assembly”  (Clark 2011,  p.  458).  On
Clark’s  view,  cultural  practices  only  set  the
scene for the real work of integration to be done
by  the  brain.  Whilst  it  is  arguable  whether
Clark’s position is a return to “good old fash-
ioned internalism,”  he certainly does not  give
cultural  practices  a  central  role  in  assembling
and orchestrating cognitive systems.13 Hutchins,
by contrast, is committed to a full-blooded en-
culturated approach: 
[t]he ecological assemblies of human cogni-
tion  make  pervasive  use  of  cultural
products.  They  are  always  initially,  and
often subsequently, assembled on the spot
in  ongoing  cultural  practices.  (2011,  p.
445)
CI is the only variant of strong embedding (in-
cluding  EM)  to  explain  the  role  of  cultural
practices in assembling integrated cognitive sys-
tems. Cognitive practices are inherited as part
of the developmental niche and have profound
transformative effects on our cognitive abilities.
This leads us to the main concepts required to
understand these transformations as a process
of enculturation. 
3 Enculturation: The main concepts
In this  section I  define and explain the main
concepts required to understand enculturation,
13 If this is  an accurate portrayal  of Clark’s position (and I have
tried to carefully use his own words) then, despite his protesta -
tions to the contrary, it appears to be a return to internalism, at
least for the most central and important cognitive processes.  If
the brain carrys out all the important cognitive operations, then
Clark’s  position  would  be  a  moderate  embedded  cognition  for
core cognitive abilities and an extended approach only to some of
the more peripheral cases.
other than the already explored concepts of in-
tegration and practice. I will develop the con-
cepts  of  evolutionary  continuity,  behavioural
and neural plasticity, transformation and innov-
ation, or novelty and uniqueness. In particular I
will emphasise the phylogenetic and ontogenetic
bases for modern human cognitive capacities. 
3.1 Evolutionary continuity
The concept of evolutionary continuity results
from the fact that evolution occurs gradually
with  complex  structures  evolving  over  many
generations.  Over  long  periods  of  time  these
gradual changes accumulate, resulting in large
differences. Consequently, changes to a pheno-
type occur in slow cumulative steps over long
periods of time and do not appear in a single
mutational  step. Evolutionary  continuity  de-
mands that modern human minds evolved from
earlier  archaic  variants.  Doubtless  modern
minds differ from archaic minds in important
respects,  but  these  differences  must  have
evolved over long periods of time, through slow
cumulative  mutational  changes  to  the  geno-
type. Even so, we should expect some of our
archaic traits to remain, and for more modern
variants to be built on top of them. One obvi-
ous example of this is the evolution of the hu-
man brain. 
The evolution of the human brain can, to
some extent, be seen in the gradual increase of
cranial capacity, but some of the most import-
ant changes have been in the reorganisation of
cortical  circuitry  and  interconnectivity  (Hoff-
man 2014). Although the evolution of the hu-
man brain can be understood in terms of  in-
creasing  encephalization  and  increased  con-
nectivity  between  brain  regions,  the  human
brain has essentially the same set of structures
as  any  other  primate  brain.14 Modern  brains
evolved from archaic brains and share the same
evolutionary constraints as other primates: “the
similarity in brain design among primates, in-
cluding  humans,  indicates  that  brain  systems
among related species are internally constrained
14 “Although species vary in the number of cortical areas they posses, and in
the patterns of connections within and between areas, the structural organiz-
ation of the primate neocortex is remarkably similar” (Hoffman 2014, p. 4).
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and that the primate brain could only evolve
within the context of a limited number of po-
tential  forms”  (Hoffman 2014,  p.  5).  Modern
minds are still partly archaic. 
It  is  important  to  think  of  evolutionary
continuity as running from archaic to modern.
We should try to avoid anthropomorphic tend-
encies  to  project  modern  cognitive  capacities
backwards into the hominin lineage or across to
primate species. For example, humans are excel-
lent social cognisers, but it does not follow from
this  that  we should  expect  other  primates  to
have a theory of mind.15 The evolutionary pres-
sures under which humans evolved and the ca-
pacities for complex social cognition might have
been  very  different  from  those  under  which
other  primates  evolved.  Consequently,  we
should  be  searching  for  archaic  precursors  to
modern  cognitive  capacities.  For  example,  we
might  expect  that  given  the  increasing  social
pressures in hominid social groups there would
be  precursors  to  modern  social  cognition  and
that these precursors would have been adaptive
solutions (Shultz et  al. 2012).  Modern human
social cognition would then be an evolutionary
consequence of increasing variation in the com-
plexity  of  social  organisation  and  interaction
(Sterelny 2003).
I am committed to another sense of con-
tinuity: that between biology and culture. Cul-
ture is not, as a category, distinct from the bio-
logical. Although culture is sometimes thought
of as floating free of our biological nature and
sometimes as being highly constrained by it, I
shall assume that genes and culture co-evolve16
mutually, influencing and constraining one an-
other. Therefore I shall accept no culture–bio-
logy dualism in this paper. Indeed I shall adopt
a cultural inheritance model of cognitive evolu-
tion (of the niche construction kind). However,
I  shall  always  do  so  with  archaic  origins  in
15 Indeed, it is questionable whether humans deploy a theory of mind,
or at least, perhaps they only do so on rare occasions (Hutto 2008;
Andrews 2012). Andrews has also argued that we may share a num-
ber of “mind reading” strategies with other primates that don’t in-
volve theory of mind (2012).
16 See  below  for  a  niche  construction  account  of  gene-culture
co-evolution. I favour such an account because it helps us to
understand how a developmental niche could have cumulative
downstream  evolutionary  effects  on  phenotypes  (Sterelny
2003).
mind. Archaic origins matter to cognitive evolu-
tion and they matter to the way our brains de-
velop during the lifespan.17 
In  the  “modern  synthesis”  there  is  only
one line of inheritance, and that is genetic in-
heritance.  More  recently,  biologists
(Odling-Smee et al. 2003) have proposed that
there are other  lines  of  inheritance:  ecological
inheritance  and  cultural  inheritance  (Boyd &
Richerson 2005). Many organisms construct the
niche in which they live, mate, hunt, and die.
Niche constructors modify the ancestral envir-
onment, and these modifications are bequeathed
to the next generation. Modifications encompass
physical alterations, such as living in mounds or
constructing hives, as well as cultural artefacts,
practices,  and  institutions.  Over  long  periods
these alterations to the niche can have profound
effects on the phenotype. For example, the ubi-
quitous niche constructions of termites, burrows
and mounds, have profoundly altered their mor-
phology and behaviour (Turner 2000). 
Humans  are  also  ubiquitous  niche-con-
structors.  They physically  alter  their  environ-
ment and they also epistemically, socially, and
culturally  engineer  the  environment  (Sterelny
2003,  2010;  Menary 2007).  Humans  are  born
into  a  highly  structured  cognitive  niche  that
contains  not  only  physical  artefact,  but  also
representational  systems  that  embody  know-
ledge (writing systems, number systems, etc.);
skills  and  methods  for  training  and  teaching
new  skills  (Menary &  Kirchhoff 2014);  and
practices for manipulating tools and representa-
tions.  Inherited  cultural  capital  is  a  real  and
stable feature of the socio-cultural environment,
including a great variety of knowledge systems,
skills, and practices across a variety of domains
of  human  action.  As  such,  human  cultural
niches  provide  neonates  with  rich  develop-
mental  niches.  It  is  in  these  developmental
niches that humans acquire cognitive practices. 
Cognitive  practices  are  products  of  cul-
tural evolution, evolving over faster timescales
than biological evolution. Writing systems, for
example, are only thousands of years old; con-
sequently, it is highly unlikely that there is a
17 They matter because they are part of the developmental biases that
produce a robust phenotype.
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“reading  gene”  or  even  an  innate  specialised
“reading module.” This is important: cognitive
capacities for reading and writing, mathematics,
and other culturally recent forms of cognition
could  not  be  biological  adaptations  (that
evolved over long periods of time). The times-
cales for their evolution are too short. It follows
that the capacity for culturally recent forms of
cognition  must  be  acquired  through  learning
and training. 
Although there are no innate  specialized
modules for these recent forms of cognition, cor-
tical  circuits  with  which  we  are  endowed
through evolution are transformed to perform
new culturally recent cognitive functions, even
though they evolved to perform different func-
tions. Recent cognitive innovations aside, there
are good reasons to expect that evolution has
driven us to think by interacting with the envir-
onment and that this is adaptive (Sterelny 2003
2012;  Menary 2007;  Wheeler &  Clark 2008).
However, it is the scaffolding of cultural prac-
tices  that  orchestrates  the  interactions—as  in
the case of written language and mathematics. 
Structured socio-cultural niches have had
profound evolutionary consequences in the hom-
inin lineage. Structured niches have co-evolved
with  human  phenotypic  and  developmental
plasticity. We have evolved to be a behaviour-
ally plastic species (Sterelny 2012) as well as a
cultural  species.  In  this  co-evolution  we  have
developed  all  manner  of  skills,  practices,  and
activities. Why, though, are we so peculiarly be-
haviourally  plastic?  One  good  answer  to  this
question is that human behavioural and devel-
opmental plasticity is an adaptive response to
the variability and contingency of the local en-
vironment (Finlayson 2009; Sterelny 2003, 2012;
Davies 2012). This is an alternative to the view
that  we are adapted to a pleistocene hunting
and gathering environment—a view relied upon
by many evolutionary psychologists (Barkow et
al. 1992). 
Critical  to  a  co-evolutionary  account  of
cultural  practices  is  the  evolution  of  human
plasticity. Given that there is such a variety of
cultural activity, we need an account of human
evolution that will allow for variability in hu-
man behaviour. Second, we need a model that
explains how innovations in our cultural niche
are  inherited  and  propagated,  leading  to
changes in behaviour over time. The niche con-
struction  model  explains  how  both  of  these
causal  factors  could  come  into  play.  In  the
sub-sections below, I outline the importance of
behavioural  and neural plasticity,  the concept
of  transformation,  and  those  of  novelty  and
uniqueness. 
3.2 Behavioural and neural plasticity
In evolutionary terms,  humans are capable of
developing  a  wide  range  of  skills  that  allow
them to cope with a wide variety of environ-
ments (and their contingencies).  For example,
even  where  skills  are  (broadly)  of  the  same
type,  such as hunting,  they will  vary in how
they cope with the differences in local environ-
ments—think of the differences in environments
between  Aboriginal  hunters  in  the  Pilbara
desert,  hunter-gatherers  in  the  Central  Amer-
ican rainforests, and Inuit seal-hunters (Sterelny
2003, p. 167).
Development  is  extended  in  modern  hu-
mans relative to other species. Humans take a
long time to learn how to walk and talk, and
much,  much  longer  to  develop  fine-grained
manual and cognitive skills such as reading and
writing. Other primates have much faster devel-
opmental timescales. While this might make hu-
mans  more  dependent  on  their  caregivers  for
longer, it also allows them to refine skills and
acquire a greater array of them before entering
adulthood.
Through  cultural  inheritance,  knowledge,
skills, and artefacts are passed on to the next
generation,  but  learning  environments  and
learning techniques are also passed on so that
the next generation can acquire and be trans-
formed by the inherited cultural capital.  This
last  point  is  important  for  our  purposes,  be-
cause  developmentally  plastic  humans  need
scaffolded  learning  environments  in  which  to
develop.18
18 If the cognitive abilities for manipulating artefacts and representa-
tions are not innate, then a scaffolded learning environment helps to
explain how we acquire them.
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How, though, are we capable of acquiring
these new cultural  capacities  in  development?
Through neural plasticity. Rather than the pro-
cess of synaptogenesis or lesion-induced plasti-
city,19 the kind of plasticity I will discuss here is
what I call learning driven plasticity (see Men-
ary 2014). Learning driven plasticity (LDP) can
result in both structural and functional changes
in  the  brain.  Structurally,  LDP can result  in
new connections  between existing  cortical  cir-
cuits. Functionally, LDP can result in new rep-
resentational capacities (the ability to represent
public symbolic representations such as alpha-
bets and numerals) and new cognitive abilities,
such  as  mathematics,20 reading,  and  writing
(Dehaene 2009; Ansari 2012). It should come as
no surprise that learning drives structural and
functional changes in the brain, given the exten-
ded developmental  period in  humans and the
late development of the cortex (Thatcher 1991).
The brain changes, not just because of matura-
tion, but also because of learning: 
[w]hen children learn to read, they return
from  school  ‘literally  changed’.  Their
brains will never be the same again. (De-
haene 2009, p. 210)
Famously, Dehaene argues that a region of the
occipito-temporal  junction (which  he calls  the
VWFA, visual word form area) that is part of a
wider network for recognising faces, objects, and
even abstract shapes (such as chequer patterns),
alters its function to recognise written symbols
in alphabets and even logographic scripts such
as  kanji  (Dehaene 2009).  This  is  due  to  the
plasticity of that area of the brain, where the
functional shift is due to scaffolded learning.21
“Scanning  of  ‘ex-illiterate’  adults  who learned
to read during adulthood has demonstrated that
the VWFA is highly plastic, even in adults, and
19 Many neurological studies of plasticity focus on synaptogenesis, the
florid growth of grey matter and then the consequent pruning, or the
synaptic  death of  many of  those  neurons in  the so-called critical
period of childhood. There are a large number of studies of neural
damage, often by stroke or injury, where cortical circuitry becomes
damaged and its function impaired, but where other areas of the cor-
tex can take on the impaired function. (See Huttenlocher 2002 for an
overview.)
20 I will be defending an account of mathematical cognition in section 4.
21 See Menary (2014) for a discussion of plasticity and the VWFA.
quickly enhances its response to letter strings as
soon as the rudiments of reading are in place”
(Dehaene &  Cohen 2011, p. 259).  Even those
who are not convinced that a specialised region
for “word recognition” is acquired once we learn
to read admit that the occipito-temporal junc-
tion  is  part  of  a  reading  and  writing  circuit
(e.g., Price & Devlin 2011).
We have evolved to be phenotypically and
developmentally plastic. This is in no small part
due to the plasticity of our brains. Our develop-
mentally  plastic  brains  exhibit  learning-driven
plasticity.  When  the  brain  is  coupled  to  a
highly scaffolded learning environment it is pro-
foundly transformed, structurally and function-
ally, and consequently we are cognitively trans-
formed in the profoundest way. 
3.3 Transformation
The transformation thesis can be given a simple
formulation:  cognitive  transformations  occur
when the development of the cognitive capacit-
ies of an individual are sculpted by the cultural
and social  niche  of  that  individual.  Cognitive
transformations result from our evolved plasti-
city  and  scaffolded  learning  in  the  develop-
mental  niche.  In  the  previous  sub-sections  an
account was given of the effects of cultural in-
heritance  and  niche  construction  on  hominid
evolution.  The result  is  phenotypic  plasticity,
and  in  the  cognitive  case  the  co-evolution  of
neural plasticity and scaffolded learning. How-
ever, the point of the transformation thesis is to
drill down into the process of acquiring know-
ledge,  skills,  and  cognitive  abilities  via  learn-
ing-driven plasticity and scaffolded learning. It
does this by showing how transformations are a
result of the role of cognitive practices in devel-
opment.  Practices  structure  the  niche;  they
transform  plastic  brains  via  learning  driven
plasticity and result in new cognitive abilities. 
During the learning and training of a skill,
such as flaking an arrowhead, or a shot in ten-
nis or cricket, we are guided by the norms for
the  correct  actions  that  make  up  the  skilled
practice. A parallel case can be made for cognit-
ive abilities such as mathematics. The neophyte
mathematician gains mastery over the cognitive
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norms22 by  which  numerals,  operators,  and
other symbols are created and manipulated. Vy-
gotsky expresses this in the claim that children,
“master the rules in accordance with which ex-
ternal signs must be used” (Vygotsky 1981, pp.
184–185).  Initially  the  child  masters  the  cre-
ation and deployment of spoken linguistic signs
(and later written signs) through the scaffolding
of parents and caregivers. However, this process
is not simply a matter of gaining new represent-
ations; it is also one of gaining new abilities.
Neophytes  go  through  a  process  of  du-
al-component transformation: they learn how to
understand and deploy public symbolic represent-
ations and they learn how to create and manipu-
late inscriptions of those symbols in public space
(Menary 2010). In so doing, they learn mathem-
atical and linguistic concepts and they learn how
to manipulate inscriptions to complete cognitive
tasks.  When  learning  the  manipulative  tech-
niques, the first transformation is one of the sens-
ory-motor abilities for creating and manipulating
inscriptions: we learn algorithms like the partial
products algorithm23 and this is an example of the
application of a cognitive practice. This is some-
thing we learn to do on the page and in the con-
text of a learning environment, in public space,
before we do it in our heads. Our capacities to
think have been transformed, but in this instance
they are capacities to manipulate inscriptions in
public space. This is a way of showing that the
transformation of our cognitive capacities has re-
cognisably public features. This ought not to be a
surprise, given that the cognitive niche is socially
and culturally constructed and is structured by
socio-cultural practices. Symbol systems, such as
those for written language and mathematics, are
not impermanent scaffolds that we shrug off in
adulthood, but are permanent scaffolds that in-
delibly alter the architecture of cognition.24 
The transformatory position is quite differ-
ent from that held by Clark or Sterelny. In par-
ticular it holds that our basic cognitive capabil-
ities are transformed in development and that
the dual component transformation results in a
22 For an account of cognitive norms see Menary (2007), Chapter
6.
23 I’ll look at this example in detail in section 5.
24 I take this issue up again in section 4.1.
distinct functional redeployment of  neural cir-
cuitry  and new abilities  to  bodily  manipulate
structures in public space. Cognitive tasks can
be completed by manipulating written symbols
in public space or by off-line strategies for com-
pleting  algorithms,  or  a  combination  of  both.
This conclusion sits happily with the idea that
thought  is  interactive  and  governed  by  prac-
tices. 
The main  difference  between the  position
outlined  here  and  Clark’s  (e.g.,  2008),  is  that
Clark  does  not  explain  cognitive  extension  in
terms of the transformation of basic cognitive re-
sources  during  development  in  a  socio-cultural
niche (although he does acknowledge the import-
ance of symbolically structured niches). Rather,
he thinks that basic biological resources are not
really transformed but simply dovetail to external
symbols (Clark 2008, 2011). Sterelny (2010) con-
centrates on cognitive scaffolding, but does not
think that the manipulation of symbols in public
space is constitutive of cognitive processing. The
enculturated  approach  of  CI  answers  questions
that are problematic for both Clark and Sterelny:
1. How do we learn to complete cognitive tasks
that require the manipulation of symbols in
public space?
2. Assuming  that  cognitive  processing
criss-crosses between neural space and public
space, how does it do this?
The first question is hard for Clark since he does
not think that our basic cognitive resources get
transformed,  at  least  in  the  way  that  I  have
presented here. The second question is hard for
Sterelny because he limits himself to a scaffolded
view of cognition rather than an extended view.
Consequently, manipulations of symbols in public
space are not cognitive processes for Sterelny.25 
CI as a process of enculturation requires a
robust  transformation  thesis.  A  robust  trans-
formation  thesis  is  warranted  by  phenotypic
and neural plasticity, in particular by learning
driven plasticity. Novel and unique public sys-
25 Or they might be assuming that Sterelny does not care either way;
in private communication Sterelny indicated that he does not think
that boundary disputes are of much interest.
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tems of representation drive the transformation
of our existing cognitive abilities. 
3.4 Novelty and uniqueness
Sometimes symbols and tools provide us with
novel functions: they radically extend our cap-
abilities in some sphere. Take the humble hand
axe.  Very  crude  hand  tools  have  been  dis-
covered dating as far back as 2.6 mya (million
years  ago;  Toth &  Schick 2006),  since  then
there has been evidence of a hominid capacity
for cumulative cultural inheritance “which was
ultimately to transform Homo sapiens into the
richly cultural species we are today” (Whiten et
al. 2011). However, the capacity for developing
novel  functions and transmitting them to the
next generation with high fidelity appears to be
a more recent innovation, as evidenced by the
long periods of relative stability in technological
development in the early hominids and archaic
humans.  It  also  appears  to  be  an  innovation
unique to the homonin lineage (Whiten et al.
2011). The Oldowan period begins in the lower
paleoloithic with Homo Habilis around 2.6 mya,
being taken up by Homo Erectus and Ergaster
and ending at about 1.8 mya (Lycett & Gowlett
2008). The tool types and process of manufac-
ture remain consistent during this period, with
some refinement and novelty (Lycett & Gowlett
2008), where the main tool types were choppers
and  scrapers  or  mode  1  tools  (Semaw et  al.
2003).
Homo Habilis is unique in that it is  the
first hominid to make tools that were made to
endure and be re-usable (it is likely that earlier
anthropocines  used  naturally-occurring  objects
as tools that were disposable; Jeffares 2010).
Oldowan toolmaking involves the produc-
tion of sharp-edged flakes by striking one
stone (the core)  with another  (the ham-
merstone).  Effective  flake  detachment
minimally  requires  visuomotor  coordina-
tion  and  evaluation  of  core  morphology
(e.g.,  angles,  surfaces)  so  that  forceful
blows may reliably be directed to appro-
priate targets (Stout et al. 2008, p. 1940). 
There is a clear transition to Achulean techno-
logy at around 1.7 mya with the appearance of
Erectus/Ergaster.  The  main  innovation  for
Achulean technology was the bifacial handaxe—
a handheld cutting tool with two cutting sides.
The real explosion in novelty occurs in the up-
per paleoloithic  period, from 50,000 years ago
(ya) to 10,000 ya (or to just before the advent
of  agriculture  and  the  neolithic  period),  with
genuine novelty in tool production and use and
cultural diversification. In this period we begin
to see evidence of art, including paintings and
sculpture, fishing, jewellery, burial, evidence of
musical activity, and all the hallmarks of beha-
viourally modern humans.  It  is  in this period
that the combination of inherited cultural cap-
ital, with phenotypic and learning-driven plasti-
city, complex social relations and language res-
ults in an explosion of cultural and behavioural
diversity.
It is also in this period that we begin to
find  evidence  of  proto-numerical  and  writing
systems  as  novel  representational  innovations.
Simple tally notch systems on bone fragments
have been dated to between 35,000 and 20,000
ya, and may have been used for a variety of
purposes, the most obvious being to keep track
of economic exchanges. However, it is far easier
and  more  economical  to  keep  track  of  larger
amounts using a single symbol, rather than a
one-to-one correspondence of marks with things.
The  complex  social  and  economic  pres-
sures that required tracking exchanges involving
increasingly large numbers would be the kind of
socio-economic pressures that produced symbol-
isation of quantity. Social and cultural pressures
can  drive  evolutionary  novelty,  in  this  case
symbolisation and uniqueness—symbolic repres-
entations are unique in both type and property,
no  other  animal  produces  written  symbols  to
represent concepts. Symbols have unique prop-
erties that allow for operations—addition, sub-
traction, multiplication, division, and so on that
are much harder (if not unlikely) without them.
Early symbolic number systems date from
between  3000–4000  BCE,  but  genuinely  ab-
stract symbol systems are even more recent—
about 1000–2000 BCE. The invention of symbol
systems is  too  recent  to be a genetic  endow-
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ment, but is  inherited as cultural capital  and
acquired  through  high-fidelity  social  learning
(which is in turn dependent upon neural plasti-
city).
The phylogeny of hominid tool-use is one
of hard-won innovation and retention. Modern
humans have developed high-fidelity modes of
transmitting cultural capital vertically and hori-
zontally.  The socio-cultural  pressures  that  led
to humans innovating symbolic representational
systems  are  unique  and  very  recent.  Fortu-
nately,  modern  human  minds  are  flexible
enough to  both  innovate  and reliably  acquire
those innovations in ontogeny.26 This flexibility
makes modern human minds unique, and in the
case of mathematical cognition unique amongst
all our primate relatives. 
The  next  section  outlines  mathematical
cognition as a case of enculturation, and there I
will explore the example of mathematical cogni-
tion by deploying the concepts refined in the
first two sections. 
4 Numerical cognition
In this section I outline the phylogenetic basis
of mathematical cognition. That basis is in our
shared sense of quantity and our ability to es-
timate the size of small sets by making approx-
imate judgements of the size of the set. This an-
cient endowment is the basis for our mathemat-
ical  competence,  but  it  is  not  all  there  is  to
mathematical cognition. This is because precise
mathematics  depends upon a very recent and
acquired  public  system  of  exact  and  discrete
mathematical  thinking.  The ancient  system is
analogue and approximate, but mathematics re-
quires digital and discrete representations and
exact  operations.  These  are,  of  course,  recent
additions to inherited cognitive capital. I shall
show why mathematical cognition requires our
ancient capacity for numerosity and how it is
constituted by cognitive practices—which trans-
form our cognitive abilities,  resulting in novel
and unique modern human cognitive capacities.
However, this transformation results in two par-
tially  overlapping  systems—the  approximate
26 This section has put together a case for the flexibility of modern minds and
the ability to acquire cultural innovations quickly and easily in ontogeny.
number system and the discrete number system
—with the latter having unique properties ac-
quired  from  cultural  innovation.  One  of  the
puzzles is how it is possible to move from an in-
herited approximate system to an acquired ex-
act  system.  The  process  of  enculturation
provides the mechanisms by which such a move
takes place, from the ancient capacity for nu-
merosity  to  development  in  a  socio-cultural
niche, and the orchestrating role of practices in
the assembly of the cognitive systems respons-
ible for mathematical cognition. 
4.1 Numerosity in animals and humans
There  is  strong  evidence  to  suggest  that  we
have a basic analogical and non-linguistic capa-
city to recognise quantity and number. I think
that there is overwhelming evidence for an an-
cient evolutionary capacity to discriminate car-
dinality,  and to determine  in  an approximate
way the quantity of membership of sets. It is
obvious how this capacity, for only very small
sets, would be beneficial for activities such as
foraging, hunting, and so on. 
Recent  studies  have  revealed  that  the
neural  populations  that  code  for  number  are
distributed in the intraparietal sulcus (Dehaene
&  Cohen 2007). A growing number of studies
show that both animals and humans possess a
rudimentary numerical competence, which is an
evolutionary  endowment.  For  example,
red-backed  salamanders  have  been  shown  to
choose  the  larger  of  two  groups  of  live  prey
(Uller et  al. 2003).  Single  neuron  activation
studies in rhesus monkeys (Nieder et al. 2006)
discovered that  individual  neurons respond to
changes  in  number  when  presented  visually
(and non-symbollically). These neurons are also
located in  the intraparietal  sulci,  indicating a
probable  cross-species  homology.  The  neurons
peak at the presentation of a specific quantity
of  dots,  but  then  decrease  as  the  numbers
presented differ from the original. So a neuron
that peaks at the presentation of two dots re-
sponds less to three or four dots. The further
the numerical distance of the array of dots is
from  the  magnitude  to  which  the  neuron  is
tuned, the lower the firing rate of the neuron.
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Therefore, the ancient capacity for numerosity
is an approximate function, not a discrete one
(DeCruz 2008). 
This is not yet counting; counting is exact
enumeration. Subitizing is the ability to imme-
diately recognise the size, or number, of a small
set—usually <4. Most animals subitize, rather
than count.  Infant  humans also  appear to be
able to subitize  (Rouselle &  Noël 2008).  This
ancient or approximate number system (ANS)
is a non-linguistic continuous representation27 of
quantities above 4; Dehaene calls it the number
sense  (1997).  Take  the  following  example.
Whilst it is easy enough to determine which of
the  following  two  boxes  contains  the  larger
number of dots without having to count them:
Figure 1: Subitizing or counting?
It is less easy to do so for the following
(you will probably need to resort to counting):
Figure 2: Subitizing or counting?
It is also possible to make estimations or
approximate judgements of scale for numbers.
Most people can quickly identify that 7 is larger
than 3. Even for more complicated exact opera-
tions we can do this:
34 + 47 = 268 (is this right?)
27 The appearance of the word representation here need not raise con-
cerns; these are not representations with propositional contents and
truth conditions. They are not symbolic and are not molecular con-
stituents that can be combined to make more complex representa-
tions.
We readily reject this result, because the pro-
posed quantity is too distant from the operands
of the addition (Dehaene 2001, p. 28). 
34 x 47 = 1598 (is this right?)
Approximation  involving  proximity  and  dis-
tance will  not help here (unless  you are very
practised  at  mental  multiplication),  but  you
might  resort  to  a  multiplication  algorithm
(which might be routinized). It is clear that we
have an ancient sense of quantity and are good
at making judgements about more than and less
than, but when it comes to precise and discrete
quantities (particularly larger numbers) we need
new capacities to be able to make judgements
about operations on discrete numbers.
4.2 Two overlapping systems
The approximate numerical system is an ana-
logue and approximate system for discriminat-
ing non-symbolic  numerosities  greater  than 4,
but the “representations” are approximate and
noisy. The second system is acquired and con-
cerns discrete symbolic and linguistic represent-
ation of individual numbers from our numeral
system, including individual words for numbers.
This  system works  with  discrete,  exact,  sym-
bolic representations of quantity and allows for
the exact operations of arithmetic and mathem-
atics. I will call this the discrete numerical sys-
tem (DNS). There is  disagreement about how
much the two systems overlap. However, what
is clear is that the internalisation of the public
numeral system allows us to perform the kind of
digital  mathematical  operations  that  are  re-
quired  for  most  arithmetic  and  mathematical
operations (Nieder & Dehaene 2009, p. 197). 
Dehaene and colleagues produced a series of
experiments that demonstrate the separate func-
tioning of the two systems. Russian–English bilin-
guals were taught a set of exact and approximate
sums of two digit numbers in one of their lan-
guages (Dehaene et al. 1999, p. 970). Their tasks
were split into giving exact answers to additions
and giving an approximate answer to the addition
task. The interesting result was that: 
Menary, R. (2015). Mathematical Cognition - A Case of Enculturation.
In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND: 25(T). Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. doi: 10.15502/9783958570818 12 | 20
www.open-mind.net
[w]hen  tested  on  trained  exact  addition
problems, subjects performed faster in the
teaching  language  than in  the  untrained
language,  whether  they  were  trained  in
Russian or English. (Dehaene et al. 1999,
p. 971) 
This provided evidence that knowledge of arith-
metic was being stored in a linguistic format,
and that there was a switching cost between the
trained and untrained languages.  By contrast,
there  was  equivalent  performance  in  the  ap-
proximation  task,  and  no  switching  cost
between the trained and untrained languages.
Dehaene et  al. conclude  that  this  provides
“evidence that the knowledge acquired by ex-
posure to approximate problems was stored in a
language-independent form” (1999, p. 971).
This leads us to the conclusion that there
are two overlapping, but not identical, systems
for mathematical cognition. The first is the an-
cient and approximate system, the second is a
relatively new and acquired system for discrete
and digital  representations and operations. As
Dehaene & Cohen put it: 
The model that emerges suggests that we
all possess an intuition about numbers and
a sense of quantities and of their additive
nature. Upon this central kernel of under-
standing are grafted the arbitrary cultural
symbols  of  words  and numbers  […].  The
arithmetic  intuition  that  we  inherit
through  evolution  is  continuous  and  ap-
proximate.  The  learning  of  words  and
numbers  makes  it  digital  and  precise.
Symbols  give  us  access  to  sequential  al-
gorithms for exact calculations. (2007, p.
41)
The  two  systems  are  overlapping  but  not
identical because they have quite different proper-
ties.  First,  the  ancient  system  is  part  of  our
phylogeny, whereas the discrete system is an ac-
quired set of capacities in ontogeny. Second, the
ancient  system  is  analogue  and  approximate,
whereas the discrete system is digital and exact.
Third, the discrete system operates on symbols
that don’t map directly on to the ancient system. 
When  we  consider  very  large  numbers,
such as 10,000,000, there is no obvious analogue
in the ANS. Consequently, large or exotic num-
bers and operations on them do not map onto
existing cortical circuitry for numerosity. Lyons
et al. (2012) call this phenomenon “symbolic es-
trangement”.  Symbols  become  estranged
through  a  process  of  symbol-to-symbol  map-
pings,  rather  than  symbol-to-approxim-
ate-quantity  mappings  (Lyons et  al. 2012,  p.
635).
However,  there appears to be a point of
contention here: Dehaene expects there to be a
more  or  less  direct  mapping  of  symbols  to
quantities  (e.g.,  the  mental  number  line).  If
symbolic estrangement does happen, then this
would  appear  to  be  mistaken.  Lyons,  Ansari
and Beilock propose a developmental resolution
of  this  apparent  disagreement.  Children  may
start out in the acquisition of discrete number
systems by a mapping to an existing approxim-
ate neural coding of quantity, but as the system
matures  and symbols  become abstracted from
the  ancient  system,  the  mature  system splits
into two (related but not entirely overlapping)
systems: neural circuitry in the DNS tunes for
discrete symbols,28 whereas circuitry in the ANS
tunes for approximate quantities, such that dis-
crete symbols do not map directly onto approx-
imate quantities. E.g., 10,000,000. The DNS has
properties that are unique.
In the next section I return to the ques-
tion of the role of practices in assembling the
DNS.
5 Mathematical practices
The  DNS  is  dependent  upon  mathematical
practices, systems of number and algorithms for
performing  mathematical  operations,  complex
mathematical concepts such as sets, functions,
and so on. None of these practices, representa-
tions, or concepts are innate, and no one seri-
ously thinks that they are. They are culturally
inherited  and  acquired  in  the  right  learning
niche with experts willing to teach. These new
abilities  are  continuous  with  our  cognitive
28 There is evidence of narrower tuning curves for Arabic numerals in
the left intraparietal sulcus (Ansari 2008).
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phylogeny. How, though, can we put the whole
package together? This section does that job. 
5.1 Cognitive practices and the 
development of mathematical 
competence
Mathematics and writing systems are examples
of  culturally evolved symbol  systems that are
deployed to complete complex cognitive tasks.
These  systems  are  structured  by  rules  and
norms, but they are deployed as practices: pat-
terns of action spread out across a population.
In this case cognitive agents must gain mastery
over the symbols, including numerals and oper-
ators, as well as the rules for their combination.
However, they must also learn how to write and
manipulate the symbols according to those rules
in  order  to  produce  the  right  products—and
this is proceduralised. 
There  may  be  more  than  one  way  of
achieving a solution to the task. One can mul-
tiply by the partial products algorithm, or one
can use the lattice/grid method or a number of
others  that  have  been  developed  by  different
cultures  using  different  numerical  systems.
However, they all involve the same set of fea-
tures: symbols, rules, operators, spatial config-
uration, and products, and they jointly consti-
tute a practice for manipulating the symbols to
complete mathematical problems. The practices
are novel and unique to humans. 
The  methods  apply  equally  to  their
off-line equivalents, so in the page-based ver-
sion of the partial products algorithm we per-
form the multiplications from right to left and
write  down  their  products  in  rows,  carrying
numbers where necessary. In the off-line ver-
sion we can perform the same operations on
imagined  numerals,  multiplying  numbers
along the  line  and carrying  any numbers  as
required. It is  cognitively taxing to hold the
products  of  the  multiplications  constant  in
working  memory,  though  some  people  can
train themselves to become quite good at it.
Most  people  learn  off-line  multiplication  by
performing  shortcuts;  if  I  want  to  work  out
what 25 x 7 is, I just add 25 together 7 times.
On-line methods can change even within
the  same  arithmetical  systems,  so  the  partial
products algorithm works like this: 
     23
x 11
  23 (1x3 and 1x2)
+ 230 (carry 0, 1x2 and 1x3) 
253 (add products together)
However there is an equivalent algorithm that
works like this:
   23
x   11
   200 (10 x 20)
   30 (10 x 3)
+   23 (1 x23)
  253 (add products together)
The algorithms may differ, but they still involve
the practice of spatially arranging the numerals,
and performing operations on them and deriv-
ing a product, by performing the staged manip-
ulations on the page. It appears then to matter
how  we  manipulate  symbols  in  public  space,
but is there any empirical evidence for this con-
clusion?
CI predicts that it matters how symbols
are spatially arranged when they are being ma-
nipulated.  Landy &  Goldstone (2007)  found
that college-level algebraists could be induced to
make errors by altering the layout of numbers
that they were to manipulate. They did this by
altering the spacing of the equations:
F+z * t+b = z+f * b+t 
Although minor, the extra spacing was enough
to induce errors. It matters how the symbols are
spatially laid out, for this layout is the basis of
how we manipulate those symbols. In this case
the artificial visual groups created by the irreg-
ular  spacing  affected  the  judgement  of  the
validity of the equation. If the visual groupings
were  inconsistent  with  valid  operator  preced-
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ence  then  they  negatively  affected  the  judge-
ment.29
Landy & Goldstone’s work provides evid-
ence  that  expert  algebraists  are  practised  at
symbolic reasoning achieved via the perception
and manipulation of  physical  notations (2007;
Landy et al. 2014). Rather than an internal sys-
tem of abstract symbols and rules for their com-
bination (i.e., a language of thought), the sys-
tem is  composed  of  perceptual-motor  systems
and the  manipulations  of  numerals.  They are
careful to say that the manipulations must con-
form to the abstract norms of algebra.  Dutilh
Novaes (2013)  takes  this  to  be  evidence  that
mathematical competence is constituted by the
capacity to manipulate inscriptions of mathem-
atical equations. This fits very well with the CI
approach. 
Despite some interesting lacunae (savants
and  blind  mathematicians),  most  mathem-
aticians learn to manipulate numerals and other
mathematical  symbols  on  the  page,  and  they
continue to do so throughout their mature cog-
nitive  lives.  Landy  and  Goldstone’s  evidence
supports the thesis that mathematical compet-
ence is constituted, in part, by our capacity to
manipulate symbols in public space; that com-
petence is, properly, a matter of interaction. 
5.2 Continuity and transformation
We have seen that there is  an ancient evolu-
tionary  endowment  for  numerosity—an  ana-
logue and approximate system. This system is
found in other  primates  and other  species.  It
provides both the phylogenetic basis of math-
ematical cognition and the initial constraints for
the development of the DNS. The DNS did not
spring sui generis into the world. It did so be-
cause of a heady mixture of socio-cultural pres-
sures,  phenotypic  and  neural  plasticity,  social
learning  strategies,  and  cultural  inheritance.
These are the conditions for the scaffolding of
the ANS, transforming our basic biological ca-
pacities into the DNS.
New cultural functions, discrete mathem-
atical functions, and the practices for manipu-
29 In algebra multiplications are made before additions. E.g., 5+2*6 =
17 (not 42).
lating  inscriptions  transform existing  circuitry
in the brain. Once we learn how to recognise,
understand, and manipulate mathematical sym-
bols our brains undergo a profound transforma-
tion. There is a reproducible circuit for math-
ematical cognition involving a bi-lateral parietal
based approximate estimation; a left lateralised
verbal framework for arithmetic concepts (e.g.,
number words); and a occipito-temporal based
symbol recognition system (e.g., Arabic numer-
als). The system also incorporates visual-motor
systems for writing (manipulating, or pushing)
symbols in public space. 
A further important aspect of transforma-
tion is symbolic estrangement. As the DNS ma-
tures it becomes more abstract and less directly
mapped onto the approximate functions of the
ANS.  Interestingly,  at  the  same  time  expert
mathematicians become reliant upon visual-mo-
tor  capacities  for  manipulating  inscriptions.
Transformation depends upon the novelty and
uniqueness of mathematical symbols and prac-
tices. 
5.3 Novelty and uniqueness
Symbolic  number  systems  and  sequential  al-
gorithms  allow  for  mathematical  and  cognitive
novelty. Once we have a public system, all man-
ner of exotic numbers and operations can be dis-
covered:30 negative numbers,  square roots,  zero,
sets, and so on. Its importance lies in the ability
to  perform  computations  that  cannot  be  per-
formed by ancient neural functions for numeros-
ity. For example, the neural circuits responsible
for numerosity cannot (on their own) represent -3
or √54, and yet this is simply represented in terms
of public mathematical symbols (DeCruz 2008).
This is because the symbolic representations are
novel and unique. Initially, novelty results from
the pressures  of  increasing social  and economic
complexity. Small roaming bands of foragers do
not need to develop symbolic  number systems;
post-agricultural Neolithic societies settled in vil-
lages and towns do. A further issue is how nov-
elty comes about from the ability to abstractly
30 I will not address the issue of what discovery amounts to here and
will remain neutral on whether discovery reveals a platonic mathem-
atical system or simply the logical relations between concepts.
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combine symbols and functions that apply to the
symbols. I don’t propose to try to answer that
question here; however, we might think of this as
a curiosity- and creativity-driven processes. Given
uniquely human behavioural and neural plasticity
and socio-cultural complexity we might expect an
increasing  drive  towards  cognitive  innovation.
This has certainly been the story of recent cul-
tural evolution in modern human societies. 
This concludes the discussion of mathem-
atical cognition as enculturation. Now I turn to
the objections.
6 The incredible shrinking system
Why not  just  shrink  the  cognitive  system to
brain-based systems? Is there a way to bridge
the impasse between moderate and strong em-
bedding?  One  argument  concerns  whether  it
makes  any  difference  to  cognitive  science  to
consider, for example, the manipulation of pub-
lic symbols to be cognitive processes (Sprevak
2010). Ultimately, to give a decisive answer to
that question we would need to change our con-
ception of  cognitive processes  to on-going dy-
namical interactions with the environment that
loop  through  brain,  body,  and  environment.
However,  weak  and  moderate  embedded  ap-
proaches do not work with such a conception of
cognitive process; they work with an input-pro-
cess-output  style  sandwich  model,  where  pro-
cesses supervene on bodily states and processes.
For them, there is no reason to accept strong
embedding,  and  much  of  the  discussion  has
been based around thought experiments or ab-
stract definitions rather than concrete examples.
However, even on a scaffolded view of cog-
nition we can’t deny the difference-making role
the manipulations of symbols make to the com-
pletion of cognitive tasks. Manipulating public
symbols is unique; there is a difference between
internalised strategies for completing mathem-
atical  tasks  and  strategies  for  manipulating
mathematical inscriptions. Our cognitive capa-
cities cannot cope with long sequences of com-
plex symbols and operations on them. This is
why we must learn strategies and methods for
writing out proofs. Symbol manipulation makes
a unique difference to our ability to complete
mathematical tasks, and we cannot simply ig-
nore their role. If we take the approach of CI,
then mathematical cognition is constituted by
these  bouts  of  symbol  manipulation,  and  we
cannot  simply shrink the system back to  the
brain.  The  case  for  a  strongly  embedded  ap-
proach to mathematical cognition depends upon
the  novelty  and  uniqueness  of  mathematical
practices and dual component transformations.
Our evolutionary endowments of numerosity are
not up to the task of exact symbolic arithmetic
and  mathematics.  Without  symbolic  number
systems and sequential algorithms there would
be no  mathematical  innovation.  Mathematical
innovation  includes  representational  novelty:
negative numbers, square roots, zero, etc., but
also  novel  functions:  multiplication,  division,
etc. Novelty comes about from the ability to ab-
stractly combine symbols and functions that ap-
ply to the symbols.
Uniquely, symbols represent quantities dis-
cretely, but there is also the unique human ca-
pacity of manipulating symbols in public space.
We learn to manipulate symbols in public space
and we continue to do so when completing cog-
nitive tasks.
The entire system of mathematics is not
contained in a single brain. Symbol systems are
public systems of representations and practices
for their manipulation. Mathematical practices
are part of the niche that we inherit—they are
part of our cultural inheritance.
6.1 Impermanent scaffolds?
Another  objection concerns  the  impermenance
of  the  scaffolding  required  for  mathematical
cognition. Once we have internalised the scaf-
folding of symbolic number systems, we have no
further  need for  it,  except  for  communication
purposes. This claim would be proven if we did
not  continue  to  manipulate  numerals  when
completing  cognitive  tasks.  Even  if  we  think
that transformation only results in new internal
representational  resources,  and  that  this  just
amounts  to  moderate  embedding/scaffolding,
we must also concede that most mathematics is
conducted on the page. 
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Scaffolding theorists, like Sterelny, can en-
dorse this idea; indeed they can agree with the
bulk of  the framework provided by CI whilst
avoiding the constitutive claim. What they can-
not do is deny that mathematical practice and
the manipulation of physically laid-out symbols
on the page is a difference maker for mathemat-
ical cognition. If you remove it, the ability to
complete  mathematical  tasks  drops  consider-
ably. To do so is to fly in the face of the empir-
ical evidence from psychology (Landy &  Gold-
stone 2007)  and  cognitive  neuroscience  (De-
haene &  Cohen 2007;  Ansari 2012).  Con-
sequently,  it  is  clear  that  cognitive  practices
transform  our  mathematical  abilities,  lending
weight to the CI approach.
The case I have presented in this paper is
that symbols are not simply impermanent scaf-
folds,  they are permanent scaffolds.  They be-
come part of the architecture of cognition (and
not simply through internalisation). Mastery of
symbol  systems  results  in  changes  to  cortical
circuitry, altering function and sensitivity to a
new, public, representational system. However,
it  also  results  in new sensori-motor capacities
for manipulating symbols in public space. The
case can be made in terms of what a symbol
system is: 
A symbol  is  a  physical  mark (or  trace),
either in physical space, or as a digital trace.
Symbol systems contain rules and practices for
interpreting symbols, for combining them, and
for  ordering  and  manipulating  them.  A large
body  of  often  tacit  practices  for  interpreting
and manipulating symbols is acquired. Scaffold-
ing is not simply an amodal symbol with an ab-
stract designation that needs to be learnt (or
mapped onto some innate symbol); scaffolding
is also how the symbols are physically arranged,
how symbols are pushed from one place to the
next in a regular fashion. Finally, scaffolding is
also how we use our own bodies, eyes, ears, and
hands to create and manipulate symbols. 
7 Conclusion
I have presented a case for CI as a process of
enculturation,  with  mathematical  cognition  as
an example of the process of enculturation at
work. I began by laying out the 4E landscape
and locating CI within it, relative to enactivism
and EM. In particular I showed how CI shares
the  interactive  stance  of  enactivism  and  the
constitutive stance of EM, but how it also dif-
fers from these. The main difference between CI
and enactivism is that CI does not equate life
and mind in the way that enactivism does. The
main difference between CI and EM is that CI
takes cultural practices to play a central role in
the assembly of cognitive systems, whereas EM
does not. 
I then went on to outline the central con-
cepts required to make sense of enculturation.
The CI framework embraces both evolutionary
continuity and transformation of existing cog-
nitive  circuitry  in  development.  Our  modern
minds are built on archaic precursors by slow
incremental changes. However, modern humans
are behaviourally plastic and scaffolded learning
drives functional changes in our plastic brains.
The developmental change from the ANS to the
DNS  is  an  example  of  how  learning-driven
changes to cortical function result in new abilit-
ies, but this would not happen without the nov-
elty  and  uniqueness  of  mathematical  symbols
and the practices for manipulating them. 
I also countered two standard objections:
impermanence and shrinkage. The defence of CI
rested on the novelty and uniqueness of math-
ematical practices and symbols. 
If the CI framework is on the right track,
then human cognitive evolution has resulted in
minds that are flexible and interactive. Further-
more, cultural evolution has resulted in written
symbol systems and practices for manipulating
symbols that can be acquired (in development)
by minds like ours. The uniqueness of modern
human minds lies  in their  capacity for trans-
formation.
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